SPECIAL REPORT

A Source of Escalation or a Source of Restraint?

Whether and How Civil Society Affects Mass Killings

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Abstract

Why do some state-led mass killings end quickly while others endure for over a decade? And why do some states murder millions of constituents during the course of mass killings, whereas other states seem to retreat from the brink after killing hundreds? A large body of work has focused on the important role played by civil society and nongovernmental actors in initiating different forms of rescue, evasion, and assistance in the midst of different cases of mass killings, as well as on the political pressure they have applied in bringing about the end of civil conflicts. Despite many inspiring and hopeful cases of collective action under systems of intense repression, other research finds civil society can accelerate or exacerbate mass killings. In this paper, we test some basic mechanisms that emerge from the literature on the connection between civil society and mass killings, and we find that a complex albeit meaningful relationship exists. We find that, in general, a relatively participatory and autonomous civil society is correlated with shorter periods of mass killings. However, we also find that active civil societies are associated with higher rates of lethality, particularly when the society has high levels of inequality. Because most mass killing events are relatively short, our findings suggest that civil societies in states with uneven access to power are more commonly correlated with longer, deadlier spells of government violence. This conclusion seemingly supports the view of civil society skeptics, at least in highly unequal contexts where mass killings have already begun.

Introduction

Why do some state-led mass killings end quickly while others endure for over a decade? And why do some states murder millions of constituents during the course of mass killings, whereas other states seem to "retreat from the brink"[1] after killing hundreds or even thousands? A large body of work has focused on the important role played by civil society and nongovernmental actors in initiating different forms of rescue, evasion, and assistance in the midst of different cases of mass killings, as well as on the political pressure they have applied in bringing about the ends of civil conflicts.[2] In cases as diverse as Nazi Germany,[3] Nazi-occupied Holland[4] and France,[5] Rwanda,[6] India,[7] East Timor,[8] Colombia,[9] the Ottoman Empire,[10] and Eastern Europe,[11] civil society actors in the form of churches, civic organizations, labor unions, local community councils, and transnational networks have played important roles in halting or foiling killings, providing protection, and reducing the number of people killed overall.

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[1] Scott Straus, "Retreating from the Brink: Theorizing Mass Violence and the Dynamics of Restraint," *Perspectives on Politics* 10, no. 2 (2012): 343–62.

[2] Desirée Nilsson, "Anchoring the Peace: Civil Society Actors in Peace Accords and Durable Peace," *International Interactions* 38, no. 2 (2013): 243–66; Leymah Gbowee, *Mighty Be Our Powers: How Sisterhood, Prayer, and Sex Changed a Nation at War* (New York: Beast Books, 2011); Geoffrey Robinson, *"If You Leave Us Here, We Will Die": How Genocide Was Stopped in East Timor* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009); Jacques Semelin, *Unarmed against Hitler: Civilian Resistance in Europe, 1939–1943* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1993); Jacques Semelin, Claire Andrieu, and Sarah Gensburger, eds. *Resisting Genocide: The Multiple Forms of Rescue* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014); Deborah Avant et al., eds. *Civil Action and the Dynamics of Violence*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2019).

[3] Helen Fein, *Accounting for Genocide: National Responses and Jewish Victimization during the Holocaust* (New York: Free Press, 1979); Michael Phayer, "The Catholic Resistance Circle in Berlin and German Catholic Bishops during the Holocaust," *Holocaust and Genocide Studies* 7, no. 2 (1993): 216–29.

[4] Robert Braun, "Religious Minorities and Resistance to Genocide: The Collective Rescue of Jews in the Netherlands during the Holocaust," *American Political Science Review* 110, no. 1 (2016): 127–47; Frederico Varese and Meir Yaish, "The Importance of Being Asked: The Rescue of Jews in Nazi Europe," *Rationality and Society* 12, no. 3 (2000): 307–34.

[5] Bob Moore, *Survivors: Jewish Self-Help and Rescue in Nazi-Occupied Western Europe* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).

[6] Timothy Longman, *Christianity and Genocide in Rwanda* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

[7] Ashutosh Varshney, *Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life: Hindus and Muslims in India* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2002).

[8] Robinson, *"If You Leave Us Here, We Will Die."*

[9] Oliver Kaplan, *Resisting War: How Communities Protect Themselves* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017).

[10] Hasmik Tevosyan, "Rescue Practices during the Armenian Genocide," in *Resisting Genocide: The Multiple Forms of Rescue*, eds. Jacques Semelin, Claire Andrieu, and Sarah Gensburger (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 163–82.

[11] Patrice C. McMahon, *Taming Ethnic Hatreds: Ethnic Cooperation and Transnational Networks in Eastern Europe* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2007).

Despite these inspiring and hopeful cases of collective action under systems of intense repression, other research suggests that stronger civil societies can exacerbate mass violence. This perspective falls into two groups: one that sees civil society as *mobilizing* mass killings[12] and another that sees an active civil society as *vulnerable to* mass killings.[13]

Examples of the *mobilizing* mechanism can be seen among the fascist groups (and parties) that emerged out of the dense and robust civil societies observed in Weimar Germany as well as in post-World War I Italy.[14] Groups and networks aligned with the Nazi Party served as convenient sources of recruitment, information sharing, and coordination once deportations and killings of Jews and other minorities began. Omar Shahabudin McDoom finds that social capital in Rwanda enabled greater capacity for mass killing.[15] Robert Braun suggests that churches that enjoyed incumbent political power did little to shelter Jews or stop their deportations during the Holocaust.[16] Timothy Longman shows that some church communities in Rwanda actively reinforced racist narratives and helped to organize and coordinate—and ultimately to perpetrate—killings of Hutus.[17] Geoffrey Robinson describes a similar process among state-aligned civilian militias during the anti-Communist mass killing in Indonesia from 1965 to 1966.[18]

The *vulnerability* mechanism has a different impetus. Here, a strong civil society brings to the surface information about which opposition groups are most politically threatening to power. Recent work suggests that the existence of a substantial, autonomous civil society makes targeting those oppositionists more efficient. Jeffrey S. Kopstein and Jason Wittenberg argue that in locales where Jewish civil society groups began to expand their political power and make claims to equal citizenship in Poland, oppositionists and their sympathizers became easy targets, making anti-Jewish pogroms much deadlier.[19]

What is less known is whether, on balance, civil society plays a moderating or exacerbating role in societies during periods of upheaval or national crisis. In this paper, we build upon earlier work that suggests that violence will reach a "higher level when sources of escalation are strong and sources of restraint are weak."[20] We leverage new data on civil society characteristics from the Varieties of

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[12] For example, Michael E. Mann, *The Dark Side of Democracy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Omar Shahabudin McDoom, "Antisocial Capital: A Profile of Rwandan Genocide Perpetrators' Social Networks," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 58, no. 5 (2014): 865–93; Longman, *Christianity and Genocide in Rwanda*.

[13] Jeffrey S. Kopstein and Jason Wittenberg, *Intimate Violence: Anti-Jewish Pogroms on the Eve of the Holocaust* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2018).

[14] Sheri Berman, "Civil Society and the Collapse of the Weimar Republic," *World Politics* 49, no. 3 (1997): 401–29.

[15] McDoom, "Antisocial Capital."

[16] Braun "Religious Minorities and Resistance to Genocide."

[17] Longman, *Christianity and Genocide in Rwanda*.

[18] Geoffrey Robinson, *The Killing Season: A History of the Indonesian Massacres, 1965–66.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2018.

[19] Kopstein and Wittenberg, *Intimate Violence*.

[20] Straus, "Retreating from the Brink." Straus describes forces of restraint as "ideas, interactions, and institutions that prompt leaders and/or citizens to abstain from or moderate the use of extensive violence against civilians" (344). It is the latter outcome—the moderation of extensive violence against civilians once it has begun—that interests us here.

Democracy dataset[21] to test some basic mechanisms that emerge from the literature on more general relationships between civil society and mass killings.

We find complex albeit theoretically consistent results that suggest that civil society has discernible impacts on the duration and severity of state-led mass killings; these impacts indicate that civil society can both escalate and restrain mass killings depending on the context in which it operates and how civil society behaves and is organized in relation to the state. We find that, in general, robust and autonomous civil societies are correlated with shorter mass killings. However, we also find that autonomous civil societies organized against the state are associated with higher rates of lethality, particularly in countries where socioeconomic inequality is high and racial and ethnic subgroups wield even levels of political power. Although we cannot fully ascertain whether this is because civil society tends to mobilize in favor of mass killings, whether civil society tends to provide ready targets for mass killing, or both, this conclusion generally supports the view of civil society skeptics, particularly in highly unequal contexts where mass killings have already begun.

The empirical analysis makes several important analytical contributions. First, our analysis is conditional on the onset of state-led mass killings. We eschew the difficult task of explaining the *onset* of mass killings and instead focus on variation in the *duration* and *scope* of mass violence. In doing so, we adopt Scott Straus's admonition that "The outcome in question should not be modeled as a two-stage outcome of policy conception and implementation, but rather as a multi-stage, dynamic process subject to conditions that could cause escalation, de-escalation, or non-escalation."[22] For our purposes, this is especially important because mass killings are exceedingly rare events. By limiting our analysis to comparing cases in which mass killings have already begun, we can more easily observe whether civil society's restraining effects pass the "stress test" of a violent national crisis.[23]

Second, until the past decade, most scholarship on genocide, politicide, and mass killings fell into one of two categories: either they focused on "macro" societal factors, such as regime type,[24], war and instability,[25] and nationalism,[26] or they focused on micro-level factors, such as personality type,[27] obedience to authority,[28] and moral cognition or identity[29] in explaining why people become bystanders, perpetrators, or resisters of genocide. In contrast, more recent works have pushed for highlighting the impacts of meso-level, societal factors on mass killings rather than focusing only on static, state- or

[21] Developed by the V-Dem Institute, Department of Political Science, University of Gothenburg, Sweden, https://www.v-dem.net/en/.
[22] Straus, "Retreating from the Brink," 344.
[23] Straus, "Retreating from the Brink."
[24] Rudolph Rummel, *Death by Government* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1994).
[25] Barbara Harff, "No Lessons Learned from the Holocaust? Assessing Risks of Genocide and Political Mass Murder since 1955," *American Political Science Review* 97, no. 1 (2003): 57–73.
[26] Mann, *The Dark Side of Democracy*.
[27] Samuel P. Oliner and Pearl M. Oliner, *The Altruistic Personality: Rescuers of Jews in Nazi Europe* (New York: Free Press, 1998).
[28] Stanley Milgram, *Obedience to Authority: An Experimental View* (New York: Harper & Row, 1974).
[29] Michael L. Gross, "Jewish Rescue in Holland and France during the Second World War: Moral Cognition and Collective Action," *Social Forces* 73, no. 2 (1994): 463–96; Kristen Renwick Monroe, *Ethics in an Age of Terror and Genocide: Identity and Moral Choice* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011).

international-level conditions or individuals' dispositional traits as the primary drivers of this grisly phenomenon.[30] Although we are not entirely able to move beyond fairly macro analyses in this initial study, our findings provide ample evidence to justify further research into the conditions under which civil society accelerates or stalls mass killings, and they also point us to some potential directions for refining our hypotheses and analysis in deeper research on particular cases.

Although further investigation is needed, this analysis is vital for a number of practical reasons. Crucially, typical policy approaches speculate that a free and active civil society is essential to peacebuilding, conflict prevention, and, by extension or implication, the prevention of mass killings. Although on balance such initiatives may have yielded important benefits—including the prevention of the onset of mass killings[31]—once mass killings begin, the creation or support of civil society in pursuit of reinforcing norms of cooperation may actually create acceleratory and escalatory effects when such groups are targeted, mobilized, or both during mass killings.[32] This speaks to the heightened urgency of prevention as a policy goal, rather than of civil society capacity building alone. Civil society capacity building may have unintended, perverse effects, because in highly polarized societies, autonomous civil society groups can become the immediate targets of mass atrocities, whereas elements of civil society more closely aligned with the state can become complicit in or actively supportive of mass killings.

The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. First, we discuss the various ways in which civil society could serve as a restrainer or escalator of mass killings. From this discussion, we derive several testable hypotheses. Next, we lay out our research design to test the aggregate effects of various dimensions of civil society on the duration and lethality of mass killings. We conclude with a discussion of preliminary conclusions, practical dilemmas implied by these findings, and some proposed next steps for our project.

Civil Society: Restrainer, Escalator, or Both?

Within the literature, we observe two different schools of thought regarding the role of civil society in preventing, mitigating, or terminating mass killings. We refer to them, broadly speaking, as civil society

[30] Braun, "Religious Minorities and Resistance to Genocide"; Evgeny Finkel and Scott Straus, "Macro, Meso, and Micro Research on Genocide: Gains, Shortcomings, and Future Areas of Inquiry," *Genocide Studies and Prevention* 7, no. 1 (2012): 56–67; Lee Ann Fujii, *Killing Neighbors: Webs of Violence in Rwanda* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2011); Longman, *Christianity and Genocide in Rwanda*; McDoom, "Antisocial Capital"; Straus, "Retreating from the Brink."

[31] Evan Perkoski and Erica Chenoweth, "Nonviolent Resistance and Prevention of Mass Killings during Popular Uprisings" (ICNC Special Report Series vol. 2, International Center on Nonviolent Conflict, Washington, DC, 2018).

[32] Longman, *Christianity and Genocide in Rwanda*; McDoom, "Antisocial Capital."

optimists and civil society pessimists. Broadly speaking, optimists assume that civil society exerts a net-positive effect, tamping down the dynamics of violence. Pessimists expect the opposite. Of course, the actual effect of civil society might lie somewhere in between, or perhaps be highly interactive and conditional on other factors. While that point may be true, we use these broad conceptual categories to order our expectations and derive hypotheses that we subsequently evaluate.

The Optimists: Civil Society as Restrainer or Moderator

Civil society optimists, a group that includes many policy makers, assumes that civilian agency in the midst of armed conflict often leads to pro-social behaviors.[33] The first category of such benevolent effects include acts of help, mutual aid, and rescue. In many cases of mass killing, people trying to flee or evade the violence are highly dependent on others to share resources, provide shelter, facilitate movement, or appeal to authorities for mercy.[34] When communities engage in collective action to shelter, hide, rescue, or facilitate the flight of targeted populations, they can have a substantial impact on the survival rates among these communities.[35]

Second, civil society spreads norms of nonviolent conflict resolution, reciprocity, and community cohesion that may reduce motivations for large-scale participation in mass killings. As Ashutosh Varshney finds in his study of variations in Hindu-Muslim communal violence in India,[36] interethnic civil society organizers actively fostered dialogue and mutual understanding during periods of political crisis. Similarly, Patrice McMahon argues that transnational civil society organizations that took root in Eastern Europe during the 1990s successfully prevented the onset of mass violence by emphasizing interethnic cooperation and peace and by offering financial, technical, and moral resources to groups that adopted these principles.[37]

The third function of civil society groups concerns the sharing of information. Mass killings are often centralized and organized, although much of the information is deliberately kept hidden from various publics. Civil society groups can serve important fact-finding functions. For instance, during the Holocaust, the Catholic Resistance Circle of Berlin encouraged widespread denunciation and protest of the extermination of Jews within the Catholic Church. Although it failed to convince the broader church to do this, the group maintained contacts with both Nazi bureaucrats and other German resisters. As a consequence, the Berlin Catholics were able to obtain accurate information on the commission of the Holocaust.[38] The provision of information can be an essential task in halting mass killings in many cases. For example, in some instances, civil society groups can organize effective international intervention or can elicit the threat of international intervention, by communicating information about the on-the-ground

[33] Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, trans. Henry Reeve (London: Saunders and Otley, 1840); Varshney, *Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life*; Kaplan, *Resisting War;* Perkoski and Chenoweth, "Nonviolent Resistance and Prevention of Mass Killings"; Ervin Staub, "Building a Peaceful Society: Origins, Prevention, and Reconciliation after Genocide and Other Group Violence," *American Psychologist* 68, no. 7 (2013): 576–89; Semelin, Andrieu, and Gensburger, eds., *Resisting Genocide*.
[34] Braun, "Religious Minorities and Resistance to Genocide"; Varese and Yaish, "The Importance of Being Asked."
[35] Braun, "Religious Minorities and Resistance to Genocide."
[36] Varshney, *Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life*.
[37] McMahon, *Taming Ethnic Hatreds*; Straus, "Retreating from the Brink," 347.
[38] Phayer, "The Catholic Resistance Circle," 216.

escalation of events. According to Geoffrey Robinson's account of East Timor, for instance, the coordination of local nongovernmental organizations with transnational solidarity networks was essential to effectively communicating the impending mass violence to policy makers who were in a position to stop the violence.[39]

Fourth, Straus argues that civil society organizations can often shift public and elite opinion away from further escalation of violence.[40] Some civil society organizations are well-connected enough that genocidaires prefer not to alienate them. For example, during the Nazi occupation of Holland, national church leaders were exceedingly vocal in resisting antisemitic policies, coordinating a number of national actions and sermons denouncing antisemitism. Because they were such powerful sources of legitimacy in the country, the Nazis feared alienating them and so did not engage in mass retaliation against this show of defiance.[41] In other cases, civil society groups can actively broker arrangements between armed actors and vulnerable populations in ways that spare lives, as happened between village-level juntas and various armed combatants in the Colombian civil war.[42] In some cases, civil society groups can mobilize against security forces to prevent them from committing abuse, reducing the opportunity to persist or escalate mass killings.[43] This dynamic may be especially likely when there is high social affinity between civil society groups and members of the security forces, on the basis of shared identity or conscription practices.[44]

Indeed, early work on the role of civil society in particular cases highlights various promising instances of civil society resistance to mass killing. For instance, Helen Fein's seminal studies show that where the Catholic Church and other churches actively opposed antisemitism and, later, deportation, violence against Jews was lower than in cases where Christian organizations were acquiescent or supportive of the violence.[45] Similarly, Longman finds that dissent and noncooperation by some Christian churches slowed down and displaced genocidal violence in some Rwandan communities.[46] Although such resistance failed to stop the genocide, Longman interprets such effects as indicative of what may have happened had religious communities throughout Rwanda resisted the genocide.[47]

Some scholars argue that the degree to which civil society organizations will be subversive or complicit in mass killings depends on their ideological orientations or sociopolitical positions. For instance, groups that promote egalitarianism and unity,[48] individualism, modesty, and self-doubt[49] may be associated with

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[39] Geoffrey Robinson, *"If You Leave Us Here, We Will Die."*

[40] Straus, "Retreating from the Brink," 349.

[41] Braun, "Religious Minorities and Resistance to Genocide," 130.

[42] Kaplan, *Resisting War*.

[43] Perkoski and Chenoweth, "Nonviolent Resistance and Prevention."

[44] Ches Thurber, "Social Ties and the Strategy of Civil Resistance," *International Studies Quarterly* 63, no. 4 (2019): 974–86.

[45] Fein, *Accounting for Genocide*. See also Phayer, "The Catholic Resistance Circle."

[46] Longman, *Christianity and Genocide in Rwanda*.

[47] Longman, *Christianity and Genocide in Rwanda*," cited in "Straus, "Retreating from the Brink," 347.

[48] Simone Chambers and Jeffrey Kopstein, "Bad Civil Society," *Political Theory* 29, no. 6 (2001): 837–65.

[49] Daniel Chirot and Clark McCauley, *Why Not Kill Them All? The Logic and Prevention of Mass Political Murder* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006); Straus, "Retreating from the Brink."

greater levels of tolerance. This may lead them to perform a bridging function that reduces the duration or lethality of mass killings. Alternately, those civil society organizations that represent minority groups may be more likely to serve as restrainers of mass killing.[50] This is because, according to Braun, local minority groups are better equipped to set up "clandestine networks that are immune to individual betrayal" because of the high commitment levels of minority constituents. Moreover, minorities tend to empathize with other victims of mass persecution, making them more likely to take personal risks to protect them.[51]

In the context of national upheavals, civil society optimists would therefore see a robust civil society—especially an autonomous civil society with egalitarian ideology and a high degree of minority representation—as a force of moderation, rescue, and restraint.

The Pessimists: Civil Society as Escalator and Accelerator

As Michael W. Foley and Bob Edwards put it, "if civil society is a beachhead secure enough to be of use in thwarting tyrannical regimes, what prevents it from being used to undermine democratic governments?"[52] Indeed, according to the pessimists, civil society organizations are often complicit, cooperative with power, or actively engaged in the commission of mass killings. Careful case studies on mass killings suggest that civil society groups sometimes mobilize to collaborate with or even perpetrate pogroms that can escalate to mass killings[53]—a *mobilizing* logic. Alternatively, civil society groups often provide the basis for more easily identifying dissidents and oppositionists, thereby providing efficient targets for perpetrators of mass killings[54]—a *vulnerability* logic.

The *mobilizing* mechanisms that tie civil society organizations to mass killings are legion. First, civil society organizations often mirror, recreate, or reinforce existing political cleavages, increasing the motivation for extended mass killings. When civil society is "vertically organized,"[55] associational life serves the purpose of (or at least acquiesce to) existing power. For instance, Longman finds that in Rwanda, Catholic and Presbyterian churches, which were dominant in that country's politics and social life, actively legitimized the genocide by "practicing ethnic politics, promoting subservience to state authorities, and failing to condemn the ethnic violence that had occurred in the years before the 1994 genocide."[56]

Second, acquiescent civil society groups reduce the costs of mobilizing collective action in opposition to a group, increasing the opportunity for mass killings. McDoom, for instance, suggests four functions of social networks, including civil society groups, that fostered violent mobilization during the Rwandan genocide: (1) diffusion, in which individuals transfer information and resources among those with whom they are in routine contact; (2) influence, in which people influence one another's thoughts, emotions, and

[50] Braun, "Religious Minorities and Resistance to Genocide."
[51] Braun, "Religious Minorities and Resistance to Genocide," 127. See also, Martin L. Hoffman, *Empathy and Moral Development: Implications for Caring and Justice* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
[52] Michael W. Foley and Bob Edwards, "The Paradox of Civil Society," *Journal of Democracy* 7, no. 3 (1996): 46.
[53] Longman, *Christianity and Genocide in Rwanda*; McDoom, "Antisocial Capital."
[54] Kopstein and Wittenberg, *Intimate Violence*.
[55] Robert D. Putnam, *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000).
[56] Longman, "Christianity and Genocide in Rwanda," cited in Straus, "Retreating from the Brink," 347.

behaviors; (3) regulation, in which civil society organizations constrain or promote different activities; and (4) cohesion, in which organizations build solidarity among members and reinforce divisions and differences with those excluded from the group.[57] On this last point, civil society can involve groups that reinforce exclusionary practices and bigotry, even when not in power. Many examples of "bonding" social capital, for example, are inward looking and tend to "reinforce exclusive identities and homogeneous groups" as opposed to bridging connections across societal faultlines.[58] Lee Ann Fujii similarly found strong ties among social networks and the survival imperative to be much stronger predictors of violence than other commonly cited factors in her analysis of the Rwandan genocide.[59] On diffusion, McDoom's findings echo work by Jan H. Pierskalla and Florian M. Hollenbach, whose study of communal violence in Kenya finds that cell phone penetration served as a powerful catalyst of political violence there, because groups were able to more efficiently share information and coordinate collective action in mobilizing violence.[60]

The *vulnerability* logic is even more straightforward. Here, oppositional civil society organizations often try to confront the incumbent regime directly, threatening the status quo and increasing the motivation for mass killings. Yet oppositional civil society groups make efficient targets, because identification of key opposition members is easier.[61] This identification increases the opportunity for mass killings, especially when oppositional civil society organizations actively and openly mobilize against security forces that have already begun engaging in mass killings. In Nazi Germany, for example, the regime efficiently deported, detained, and executed perceived enemies of the state—such as members of the progressive or radical left, intelligentsia, and other oppositionists—owing to their associations with known civil society groups.

As such, civil society pessimists generally see such organizations as likely to fall prey to state violence fairly early on in the mass killing—or to escalate violence themselves. Indeed, some scholars even argue that across many episodes of mass killing, a mobilized civil society was necessary to carry out genocidal violence. Simone Chambers and Jeffrey Kopstein point out, for example, that Weimar Germany's extensive and robust civil society birthed the Nazi movement, while newly established civil societies in Russia and Eastern Europe produced the proto-fascist Russian National Unity and the Romanian National Union. The former Yugoslavia "arguably had the most developed civil society of any Eastern European country," yet it descended into genocidal violence and war nonetheless.[62] And it is worth mentioning that the United States, which possesses a large and diverse civil society, also has the dubious distinction of hosting a number of white power and white supremacist groups, the Ku Klux Klan, countless armed militias, and any number of hate groups that have openly speculated how their role in any national crisis would be escalatory rather than restrained.

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[57] McDoom, "Antisocial Capital," 870.
[58] Chambers and Kopstein, "Bad Civil Society," 841.
[59] Fujii, *Killing Neighbors*.
[60] Jan H. Pierskalla and Florian M. Hollenbach, "Technology and Collective Action: The Effect of Cell Phone Coverage on Political Violence in Africa," *American Political Science Review* 107, no. 2 (2013): 207–24.
[61] For example, Kopstein and Wittenberg, *Intimate Violence*.
[62] Chambers and Kopstein, "Bad Civil Society," 842.

Among those who argue that bridging networks serve important restraining functions on violence, micro-level studies cast further doubt. For instance, McDoom found that even though some genocidaires had interethnic social networks through intermarriage, friendship, or neighborhood, such "bridging" relationships did not exert restraint on killing during the Rwandan genocide.[63] Such findings question whether bridging social capital would serve as an adequate restraint when bonding social capital is dominant in the context of a mass killing.

Expectations

Our core proposition is to assess the extent to which civil society acts as a source of restraint or a source of escalation in the context of mass killings. To do so, we analyze variations in both the duration (length) and lethality (scale) of mass killings. In the conceptualization of the severity of state violence, increases in duration, scale, or both should correspond with increasingly severe acts of violence. Whereas lethality is perhaps the most straightforward indicator of intensity, an event that drags on for many years lengthens civilians' exposure to violence and, even if the civilians are spared, inflicts severe emotional and physical distress on them that can persist across generations. In this way, lethality is not the only means by which mass violence indelibly shapes societies.

Of course, lethality and duration do not always go hand in hand. In China's Cultural Revolution, reportedly over three million people were killed during a nine-year spell of mass killing. We can compare such cases with the mass killing recorded in Iran, where the Islamic Republic unleashed killings of political opponents—including dissident Muslims, Kurds, and Baha'i people—during its consolidation phase between 1981 and 1992. Although this violent episode lasted 11 years, the Iranian government killed far fewer people than Mao's China. In contrast to these two cases, however, lies the Rwandan genocide that resulted in the mass murder of 600,000 people in just an eight-week period in 1994. But such cases are exceptional; among the data we use here, mass killings last an average of six years and kill between 16,000 and 32,000 people. We therefore consider duration and lethality separately to get a fuller picture of the dynamics of violence.

When it comes to the relationship between civil society and the severity of mass killings, two views predominate: those of optimists and pessimists. On the one hand, optimists expect civil society to act as a source of restraint, dampening conflict dynamics and producing shorter, less lethal spates of violence. This leads to our first hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1: A robust civil society is correlated with shorter and less lethal mass violence.

[63] McDoom, "Antisocial Capital."

On the other hand, civil society pessimists anticipate the opposite: robust civil societies will act as a source of escalation, exacerbating conflict dynamics and leading to longer and more lethal mass killings.

Hypothesis 2: A robust civil society is correlated with longer and more deadly mass violence.

Those in the pessimist camp, however, offer two mechanisms for how and why mass killings will escalate in states with more robust civil societies. Some researchers articulate a logic based on vulnerability: civilians who oppose the government are more easily identified and subsequently targeted owing to their organizing activities. In effect, civil society organization solves an inherent information asymmetry for states by making clear who is part of the opposition. Moreover, we expect that state-led violence will be particularly virulent and intense when the government perceives an existential threat to its power.[64] Observationally, we should therefore expect shorter and more lethal episodes of mass violence under such conditions.

Hypothesis 2a: Robust antigovernment civil societies are correlated with shorter and deadlier mass killings.

In contrast, other civil society pessimists articulate a different logic: one based on mobilization. Here, civil society organizations are not being targeted *by* the state but are instead committing violence in partnership *with* the state. In effect, civil societies that are strongly progovernment should expand the state's capacity for violence, and mass killings should be more lengthy and severe.

Hypothesis 2b: Robust progovernment civil societies are correlated with longer-enduring and deadlier mass killings.

Finally, some research suggests that civil society is influenced by—and often replicates—the political dynamics in and around which it operates.[65] If this is true, then civil society's effect on mass violence might be conditional upon other state-level factors. Many state perpetrators of mass killings have purveyed narratives justifying violence by scapegoating out-groups. We expect such scapegoating to have particularly damaging effects under conditions of political, social, or economic inequality, which are likely to be reflected in intense polarization within civil society as well. Under conditions of intense polarization, we expect civil society to accelerate and intensify mass killings, operating through both the vulnerability and mobilizing mechanisms. On the other hand, we hypothesize that robust civil societies might be effective at mitigating mass killings when the society has lower levels of social, political, and economic inequality.

Hypothesis 3a: Civil society moderates the lethality and duration of mass killings in conditions of relative social and economic equality.

Hypothesis 3b: Civil society accelerates and intensifies the lethality of mass killings in conditions of relative social and economic inequality.

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[64] Benjamin A. Valentino, *Final Solutions: Mass Killing and Genocide in the 20th Century* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004).

[65] Putnam, *Bowling Alone*; Amaney A. Jamal, *Barriers to Democracy: The Other Side of Social Capital in Palestine and the Arab World* (Princeton, NY: Princeton University Press, 2009).

Research Design

We follow Straus's suggestion that researchers consider factors that both restrain and enable or facilitate mass killings as well as the notion that civil society may indeed operate in either direction.[66] The effects of civil society need not be purely binary; it may function differently across contexts, as we have hypothesized. Our main task, however, is to assess the general correlation between different dimensions of civil society and the intensity and duration of mass killings. We explore these possibilities with both macro and meso levels of empirical analysis,[67] using data from multiple sources and using a variety of statistical methods.

Dependent Variables and Methods

To test all of our hypotheses, we use data from two sources. The first is the Integrated Network for Societal Conflict Research (INSCR) database on mass killings, which is widely used in extant research. The INSCR defines mass killings as follows:

> Genocide and politicide events involve the promotion, execution, and/or implied consent of sustained policies by governing elites or their agents—or in the case of civil war, either of the contending authorities—that result in the deaths of a substantial portion of a communal group or politicized non-communal group.

Several criteria must be met for events to be coded as mass killings, creating a relatively high definitional threshold (table 1). First, violence must be conducted by a state or its agent; second, the event must last at least six months; and third, victims must be unarmed civilians. As one will note, casualty thresholds do not feature into the definition. In addition, victims must come from a discrete group—either an actual or "politicized non-communal group"—and government forces must target them with "systematic, lethal," and intentional acts of violence in order to eradicate them. Incidences of starvation and withholding water and medicine would therefore not be included. Episodes are coded as beginning in the month in which systematic killings begin and terminating at the "occurrence of the last serious atrocities, the end of a military campaign that targets civilian areas, or simply the absence of any further reports."[68]

[66] Straus, "Retreating from the Brink."

[67] Finkel and Straus, "Macro, Meso, and Micro Research on Genocide."

[68] Political Instability Task Force, "State Failure Problem Set: Internal Wars and Failures of Government, 1955–2017" (dataset and coding guidelines, revised July 12, 2018), http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/PITFProbSetCodebook2017.pdf.

Table 1: INSCR Coding of Mass Killing Severity

Variable Level	Civilian Fatalities
0.0	less than 300
0.5	300–1,000
1.0	1,000–2,000
1.5	2,000–4,000
2.0	4,000–8,000
2.5	8,000–16,000
3.0	16,000–32,000
3.5	32,000–64,000
4.0	64,000–128,000
4.5	128,000–256,000
5.0	256,000 +

Our second source is the recently released Targeted Mass Killings (TMK) data set from Australian National University.[69] This data set is the most detailed information available on mass killings, which the project defines as "the direct killing of noncombatant members of a group by an organized armed force or collective with the intent of destroying the group, or intimidating the group by creating a perception of imminent threat to its survival." TMK is different from other data sets in its low threshold and highly disaggregated approach. The event needs only to result in 25 or more fatalities in a given year. This is an important criterion to keep in mind when interpreting the results, and one that makes the universe of cases significantly different from that of INSCR.[70] In addition, TMK carefully codes the discrete time periods in which mass killings were taking place (e.g., not necessarily during an entire civil war, but only those years with clear evidence of intentional civilian victimization). TMK also differentiates between the perpetrators of mass violence, specifically between state and nonstate actors. We have created a subset of just the state actors in line with coding decisions from INSCR and the scope of the present study.

The TMK data have a much lower threshold for inclusion and disaggregate mass killings into specific episodes—much more so than INSCR. This practice results in a substantially different set of cases with generally shorter time periods and many more events. Despite these differences, both data sets exhibit similar patterns of mass violence over time.

To operationalize the duration of mass killings, we construct measures of how long discrete campaigns of mass violence persisted. Both data sets provide some information about the location, motives, and perpetrators of violence, and we use this information to approximate, in years, how long mass killings

[69] Charles Butcher et al., "Introducing the Targeted Mass Killing Dataset for the Study and Forecasting of Mass Atrocities," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 64 no. 7-8 (2020): 1524–1547.

[70] Although INSCR does not have a strict threshold for inclusion, only about 4 percent of coded case-years exhibit fewer than 300 fatalities.

endured. We then turn to lethality. Both data sets provide clear approximations of civilian deaths. INSCR codes lethality according to an interval scale that ranges from zero to five, in increments of one-half, for every year of a mass killing. The precise measurements are displayed in table 2. TMK offers more granular information and provides an estimate of the number of civilian deaths for each year of a mass killing.

We analyze the duration and severity of mass killings using different statistical methods. For duration, we use the Cox proportional hazards model, a semiparametric form of survival analysis that tells us how our variables influence the odds of failure—here, the end of mass killings. We cluster standard errors by the mass killing event. Then, for severity, we use linear regressions for the INSCR data owing to its interval scale,[71] while for TMK we use negative binomial regressions because deaths are measured as non-zero counts for a given year. We also used zero-truncated negative binomial regressions but, as before, virtually identical results are obtained. For both, we cluster standard errors by the mass killing event.[72]

Independent Variables

Our primary theoretical interest concerns the effect of civil society on mass killings, and we obtain civil society data from the extensive Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project.[73] We narrow our focus to three variables in particular that capture different aspects of civil society. These are listed in table 2 along with definitions. Importantly, we lag each variable so that we are analyzing how mass killings relate to the previous year's civil society indicators. We do this to sidestep some concerns about reverse causality, yet results are largely identical whether we lag these variables or not.

Hypotheses 1 and 2 relate to the overall effect of civil society, and they correspond to the debate between optimists (Hypothesis 1) and pessimists (Hypothesis 2). To test them, we use V-Dem's Core Civil Society Index, which specifically codes for "stronger, robust, and more independent civil societ[ies]."

Civil society pessimists, however, articulate competing logics for why robust civil societies will correspond to more severe mass violence. To disentangle these mechanisms, we evaluate the extent to which civil society is organized in opposition to (Hypothesis 2a) or in support of the government (Hypothesis 2b). To test the vulnerability mechanism (H2a), we use V-Dem's "Civil Society Anti-System Movement" variable, which captures the extent to which civil society organizations "pose a real and present threat to the regime." To test the mobilization mechanism (H2b), which assesses the effect of a civil society aligned with the government, we use V-Dem's measure of the "Civil Society Participatory Environment." This is coded along a scale from "Most associations are state-sponsored" to "There are many diverse CSOs [civil society organizations]."

[71] Ordered probit regressions were also assessed but provide nearly identical results to ordinary least squares.

[72] We also cluster standard errors by the specific mass-killing event to gain even more leverage over the unobserved factors specific to these particular events.

[73] Michael Coppedge et al., "V-Dem Dataset v10," Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project, 2020, https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemds20.

Hypotheses 3a and 3b reflect the possibility that the effect of civil society is mitigated by other factors—namely, social and economic inequality. In cases where inequality is high, the perverse effects of civil society might be strongest; where inequality is low, civil society may offer the antidote that optimists expect. To test whether either is true, we interact the civil society indicators with two measures of inequality that we also obtain from V-Dem. The first captures the degree to which political power is distributed according to socioeconomic status, and the second measures the degree to which political power is distributed according to social or ethnic ties. Both variables run along five-point scales in which zero means that "political power is more or less equally distributed" and four indicates that "political power is unevenly and inequitably distributed."[74]

Table 2: Operationalization of Civil Society Indicators

V-Dem Variable	Definition (V-Dem)	Relevant Mechanism/Hypothesis
Core Civil Society Index	"How robust is civil society?"	Aggregate effect on mass killings (H1 and H2)
Civil Society Anti-System Movement	"Among civil society organizations, are there anti-system opposition movements?" Ranges from "Anti-system movements are practically nonexistent" to "There is a very high level of anti-system movement activity, posing a real and present threat to the regime."	Vulnerability mechanism (H2a)
Civil Society Participatory Environment	"Which of these best describes the involvement of people in CSOs?" Ranges from "Most associations are state-sponsored" to "There are many diverse CSOs."	Mobilization mechanism (H2b)
Power Distributed by Socioeconomic Position	"Is political power distributed according to socioeconomic position?" Ranges from "Wealthy people enjoy a virtual monopoly on political power" to "Wealthy people have no more political power than those whose economic status is average or poor."	Conditional effect—lower class inequality leads to a moderating and restraining effect of civil society (H3a); higher class inequality exacerbates vulnerability and mobilization mechanisms (H3b)
Power Distributed by Social Group	"Is political power distributed according to social groups?" Ranges from "Political power is monopolized by one social group comprising a minority of the population" to "All social groups have roughly equal political power *or* there are no strong ethnic, caste, linguistic, racial, religious, or regional differences to speak of."	Conditional effect—lower racial or ethnic inequality leads to a moderating and restraining effect of civil society (H3a); higher racial or ethnic inequality exacerbates vulnerability and mobilization mechanisms (H3b)

Source: V-Dem Institute, "V-Dem Dataset v10," Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project, 2020, https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemds20.

Note: CSO = civil society organization.

[74] This scale is reversed from its original coding to facilitate interpretation.

Control Variables

Across our models of duration and severity, we include roughly the same model specifications. We choose particular covariates for their ostensible, theoretical relation to the outcomes of interest, and to account for other potential sources of escalation or restraint. To begin with, we include several variables relating to regime type. This includes an indicator of regime type (polity scores), and dichotomous measures of military, party-based, and personalist regimes from data by Barbara Geddes, Joseph Wright, and Erica Frantz.[75] We include these because existing research finds a strong link between regime type and mass violence. We also include a dichotomous measure of whether an internal war is occurring and whether a coup has occurred in the past five years. These factors may incentivize mass killings, as is the case with internal wars, or they may possibly deter them, as is the case with coups. In the latter, ruling elites may question the allegiance of their armed forces, especially when ordered to crack down on fellow citizens.[76] As for internal characteristics, we also control for institutionalized subgroup discrimination, levels of ethnic fractionalization, population size, and infant mortality rates. All of these variables are included in our models of both severity and duration, although for the severity models we also include a count of how many years the mass killing has endured.[77] For simplicity, we omit these control variables from the tables and presentation of results that follow. Full results and descriptions are contained within the appendix.

Results

Duration of Mass Killings

As noted, we rely on two separate data sources—INSCR and TMK—to study the duration of mass killings as it relates to characteristics of civil society. Results are presented in table 3.

We begin our analysis with INSCR. Here, the core civil society (CS) index and the participatory environment measure are correlated with shorter campaigns. Superficially, these findings are partially supportive of Hypothesis 1: where civil society participation is less restricted and engagement is more widespread, government campaigns of mass killings tend to be shorter.

Conversely, one variable generates a negative effect (linked with longer mass killings): the existence of antigovernment civil society. Where civil society organizations are oppositional to the state and pose "a real and present threat to the regime," campaigns of mass killing tend to drag on. Conversely, where

[75] Barbara Geddes, Joseph Wright, and Erica Franz, "Autocratic Breakdown and Regime Transitions: A New Data Set," *Perspectives on Politics* 12, no. 2 (2014): 313–31.
[76] Perkoski and Chenoweth, "Nonviolent Resistance and Prevention of Mass Killings."
[77] All of these analyses are run at the country-year unit of analysis.

antisystem civil society mobilization is virtually nonexistent, mass killings end more quickly. This means we can partially reject Hypothesis 2a—antisystem activity does not make mass killings shorter. Although such oppositional civil societies may indeed become convenient targets for a state perpetrating a mass killing, it could be that the existence of such civil society groups also indicates a high capacity for resistance against state violence. This finding comports with the strategic views of mass killings that understand these events as last-ditch efforts by the regime to remain in power and to quell domestic threats.[78] These cases might drag on as the state fights for survival. We should caution readers that antigovernment civil society behavior may be linked to longer violence because of endogeneity—the fact that oppositional civil societies may mobilize most against the worst atrocities—but it also suggests their mobilization may be ineffective at stopping a determined state's violence.

Table 3: Cox Proportional Hazards Model, Duration of Mass Killings

INSCR

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Internal War	0.151	1.079**	0.147
	(0.533)	(0.428)	(0.504)
Subgroup Discrim.	-0.953	-2.122**	-0.891
	(0.873)	(0.976)	(0.899)
IMR	-0.703	-1.065**	-0.712*
	(0.433)	(0.417)	(0.412)
Population	0.056	-0.602**	0.082
	(0.189)	(0.254)	(0.202)
Ethnic Factionalization	-2.144	0.473	-2.159
	(1.684)	(1.443)	(1.592)
Polity 2	-0.111*	-0.026	-0.100*
	(0.062)	(0.046)	(0.056)
Military Regime	-0.649	-0.239	-0.947
	(0.658)	(0.667)	(0.645)
Party-Based Regime	0.297	0.314	0.339
	(0.449)	(0.383)	(0.454)
Personalist Regime	-0.485	-0.071	-0.583
	(0.583)	(0.529)	(0.653)
Recent Coup Attempt	0.161	0.229	0.395
	(0.665)	(0.481)	(0.672)
l.Core CS Index	3.029***		
	(1.047)		
l.CS Anti-System Mvmnt		-0.828**	
		(0.329)	
l.CS Partic. Environment			0.498***
			(0.177)
Observations	222	222	222

Standard errors in parentheses (clustered by mass killing event).
Region and decade fixed effects omitted from the table.
** p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01*

TMK

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Internal War	-0.798*	-0.671	-0.785*
	(0.411)	(0.408)	(0.403)
Subgroup Discrim.	0.508	0.899	0.454
	(0.485)	(0.584)	(0.475)
IMR	0.668	0.671	0.530
	(0.587)	(0.555)	(0.597)
Population	0.218	0.106	0.148
	(0.215)	(0.251)	(0.211)
Ethnic Factionalization	-1.020	-0.739	-0.710
	(1.149)	(1.443)	(1.131)
Polity 2	0.026	0.040	0.047
	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.052)
Military Regime	0.237	-0.040	0.260
	(0.597)	(0.787)	(0.664)
Party-Based Regime	0.473	0.227	0.459
	(0.438)	(0.404)	(0.409)
Personalist Regime	-0.388	-0.404	-0.483
	(0.659)	(0.677)	(0.636)
Recent Coup Attempt	-0.159	-0.115	-0.167
	(0.415)	(0.418)	(0.416)
l.Core CS Index	0.192		
	(1.149)		
l.CS Anti-System Mvmnt		-0.233	
		(0.189)	
l.CS Partic. Environment			-0.151
			(0.184)
Observations	195	195	195

Standard errors in parentheses (clustered by mass killing event).
Region and decade fixed effects omitted from the table.
** p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01*

Note: Coefficients refer to the odds of mass violence ending. Positive coefficients imply shorter mass killings, and negative coefficients imply longer mass killings. CS = civil society; IMR = infant mortality.

[78] Valentino, *Final Solutions*; Benjamin Valentino, Paul Huth, and Dylan Balch-Lindsay, "'Draining the Sea': Mass Killing and Guerrilla Warfare," *International Organization* 58, no. 2 (2004): 375–407.

Our analyses of TMK data paint a different picture. Here, we find little in the way of meaningful associations between how long these campaigns last and our three different metrics of civil society. Not one generates statistically significant effects. In terms of control variables, we find that the duration of mass violence is also affected by other factors, though we generally encounter contradictory findings between TMK and INSCR data. As we later find, however, estimates are much more consistent when we analyze severity. This indicates that TMK's more granular approach to coding the onset and end of mass killings makes it quite distinct from INSCR. For instance, using INSCR we find a negative and significant relationship between internal wars and mass killing duration, and we find the inverse relationship when using TMK.

Our findings provide some evidence that an autonomous civil society may be an effective buffer against violence, but if it is co-opted by the state or mobilizes against the state only once violence is underway, then state violence is likely to persist. While controlling for a variety of potentially confounding factors, we find that more robust and more free civil societies are linked to shorter mass killings, whereas civil societies expressly organized against the state are linked to longer mass killings. Mobilized oppositional civil societies appear to be ineffective at halting government-led mass violence, but robust and autonomous civil societies can perhaps de-escalate state-led mass killings more quickly than their oppositional counterparts.

This finding is evident in figure 1, in which we plot the probability of a mass killing ending in a given year across different levels of the core civil society variable (going from the 1st to 99th percentiles). As this figure shows, the higher the core civil society measure, the shorter that mass killings are expected to last.

Thus, we find partial support for both hypotheses 1 and 2 in our analysis of the INSCR data, but no support for them in the TMK data. To evaluate the second components of these hypotheses—the effects of civil society on the intensity of mass killings—we next turn to our analysis of lethality.

Figure 1: Predicted Hazard of Mass Killing Termination (INSCR) at Different Levels of the Core Civil Society Index



Severity of Mass Killings

To evaluate lethality, we again use data from both INSCR and TMK. Recall that INSCR provides a five-point scale ranging from fewer than 300 fatalities to more than 256,000. TMK provides a yearly, disaggregated number of civilian fatalities. The statistical models we use to assess lethality are virtually identical to those presented above in terms of control variables with one exception: we now include a count of how long the mass killing has persisted to account for the possibility that the killings may become more or less severe over time.

Results, presented in table 4, are very consistent across both data sets: we find that the three measures of civil society are statistically insignificant when it comes to explaining how many fatalities occur in a mass killing. In other words, the net effect of civil society on the lethality of violence is indistinguishable from zero. This could mean that civil society is functioning in both ways—that some civil society groups support mobilization of mass killings and that other oppositionist civil society groups are singled out for targeting. Therefore, we find little evidence to support either Hypothesis 1 or 2 regarding lethality.

To test hypotheses 2a and 2b regarding the effects of oppositional versus loyalist civil society organizations, we rerun the models while interacting two of our civil society measures: those relating to the participatory environment and to the level of antistate activity. In effect, this allows us to test the consequences of a state-aligned and acquiescent civil society versus an independent and state-opposed civil society. If Hypothesis 2a is correct, we expect to see more lethal mass killings with more oppositional civil society, which allows the state to more easily identify and target civil society actors who oppose the state. If Hypothesis 2b is correct, we expect to see more lethal mass killings with state-aligned and acquiescent civil society, which augments the state's capacity for violence while removing resistance from civil society.

Table 4: Linear Regression, Severity of Mass Killings

INSCR

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Duration	-0.014	-0.025	-0.014
	(0.027)	(0.028)	(0.028)
Internal War	0.286	0.048	0.291
	(0.228)	(0.246)	(0.230)
Subgroup Discrim.	0.352	0.488*	0.366
	(0.322)	(0.272)	(0.319)
IMR	0.495	0.559	0.497
	(0.404)	(0.391)	(0.410)
Population	-0.079	0.116	-0.082
	(0.243)	(0.280)	(0.243)
Ethnic Factionalization	0.677	0.405	0.713
	(0.913)	(0.990)	(0.904)
Polity 2	-0.028	-0.017	-0.026
	(0.027)	(0.025)	(0.028)
Military Regime	0.854**	0.788*	0.822*
	(0.406)	(0.438)	(0.414)
Party-Based Regime	0.734	0.645	0.749
	(0.444)	(0.436)	(0.454)
Personalist Regime	0.586	0.414	0.571
	(0.383)	(0.405)	(0.378)
Recent Coup Attempt	0.275	0.291	0.296
	(0.220)	(0.228)	(0.215)
l.Core CS Index	0.532		
	(0.657)		
l.CS Anti-System Mvmnt		0.247	
		(0.149)	
l.CS Partic. Environment			0.077
			(0.111)
Observations	258	258	258

Standard errors in parentheses (clustered by mass killing event).
Region and decade fixed effects omitted from the table.
** p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01*

TMK

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Duration	-0.054	-0.058*	-0.055
	(0.038)	(0.031)	(0.033)
Internal War	0.303	0.197	0.319
	(0.374)	(0.370)	(0.372)
Subgroup Discrim.	2.348***	2.155***	2.301***
	(0.525)	(0.492)	(0.542)
IMR	0.334	0.254	0.378
	(0.581)	(0.555)	(0.629)
Population	0.102	0.214	0.118
	(0.405)	(0.399)	(0.422)
Ethnic Factionalization	-3.665*	-3.957**	-3.684*
	(1.883)	(1.854)	(1.888)
Polity 2	-0.066	-0.059	-0.069
	(0.048)	(0.037)	(0.049)
Military Regime	2.107***	2.129***	2.103***
	(0.688)	(0.724)	(0.706)
Party-Based Regime	0.946	0.907	1.019
	(1.302)	(1.010)	(1.393)
Personalist Regime	0.575	0.528	0.537
	(0.672)	(0.662)	(0.628)
Recent Coup Attempt	-0.631*	-0.575	-0.621*
	(0.372)	(0.362)	(0.373)
l.Core CS Index	0.557		
	(1.530)		
l.CS Anti-System Mvmnt		0.150	
		(0.145)	
l.CS Partic. Environment			0.118
			(0.276)
Observations	200	200	200

Standard errors in parentheses (clustered by mass killing event).
Region and decade fixed effects omitted from the table.
** p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01*

Note: CS = civil society; IMR = infant mortality.

Our analyses find the interaction term to be highly significant ($p \leq .05$) across both data sets, indicating that this dynamic is indeed meaningful to explaining variation in the lethality of mass violence, supporting both hypotheses 2a and 2b. We plot the interactions in figure 2,[79] which indicates that the most lethal mass killings arise under two conditions: first, when there is a highly independent civil society with high levels of antigovernment activity, and second, when there is a mostly state-sponsored civil society with very little oppositional activity. Despite using different statistical models on different data sets, our estimates yield virtually identical functional forms. When we analyze this same interaction on the duration of violence, the results are less consistent. Yet with INSCR we do find a statistically significant interaction, which suggests that mass killings tend to be longest with increasing levels of antisystem activity.[80] They tend to be shorter with low antisystem activity and more state-run civil societies.

[79] Full results are listed in the appendix, table A1.
[80] We plot this interaction in the appendix, figure A1.

Consequently, this means that neither civil society pessimists nor optimists are entirely correct, yet some general patterns do emerge. Civil society can moderate *and* escalate the lethality of mass violence depending on how it is organized and whether it is aligned with or opposed to the state. In line with Hypothesis 2a, robust antigovernment civil society organization exacerbates governments' sense of threat, and governments tend to escalate their violence to counteract this oppositional behavior. And, owing to their organization, such groups are easily targeted. But, in line with Hypothesis 2b, robust progovernment civil societies also intensify violence when oppositional civil society is virtually nonexistent. These groups potentially add to the state's capacity to organize and carry out violence without meaningful resistance from other civil society groups. When these two conditions obtain in tandem, mass killing lethality is highest.

Figure 2: Predicted Severity of Mass Killings across Civil Society Participation and Antisystem Activity



Note: CS = civil society. INSCR's predicted severity is based on its coding system, with higher numbers denoting more fatalities.

Does Civil Society Operate Differently across Contexts?

We already find evidence that civil society shapes the dynamics of mass violence, though the relationship is complex. States with more robust, free civil societies tend to experience shorter spells of violence, but in cases where it fully organizes with or against the state, then more fatalities tend to occur. With this in mind, we now turn to test hypotheses 3a and 3b and evaluate whether civil society's effect is shaped by societal inequalities. Specifically, we assess how these dynamics are influenced by the even or uneven distribution of political power—first, according to social group, and, second, according to socioeconomic status. Indicators of both are obtained from V-Dem. As to the first, a social group "is differentiated within a country by caste, ethnicity, language, race, region, religion, or some combination thereof." Counties are ranked on a scale on which at the lowest level, political power is equally divided among social groups or no strong social groups exist; at the highest level, "Political power is monopolized by one social group comprising a minority of the population. This monopoly is institutionalized—that is, not subject to

frequent change."[81] Regarding the second measure, V-Dem aims to capture "the extent to which wealth and income translates into political power." As before, countries are given a score; at the low end, political power is divided relatively evenly among economic groups and at the high end, "wealthy people enjoy a virtual monopoly on political power. Average and poorer people have almost no influence."

We examine these two indicators for several reasons. On the one hand, numerous case studies of mass violence reveal the salience of group identity, socioeconomic status, and political discrimination to the conflict's onset and evolution. Perhaps most notably, social group (ethnicity) was fundamental to the widespread violence in Rwanda, one of the worst mass killings in recent years. In other cases, such as in Indonesia, socioeconomic discrimination was one of several preconditions to state violence. On the other hand, we use these measures over more blunt country-level metrics of, for instance, autocracy or democracy to better capture variation among states. In addition, many of the countries experiencing mass violence would be classified as nondemocracies—be they full-blown autocracies or more mixed anocracies—which complicates our ability to speak to the effect of regime type in cases where mass violence has already begun. Using these measures, in contrast, we find substantial variation in the distribution of political power among countries experiencing mass killings. We therefore find these metrics to be more useful and more substantively interesting than more blunt political indexes.

In the following analyses we replicate the models presented earlier while interacting each of the civil society indexes with the two V-Dem measures of inequality: the extent to which political power is divided according to socioeconomic status and then according to social group. We expect civil society to moderate and de-escalate mass killings fairly quickly under conditions of relative social and class equality, and to intensify and exacerbate mass killings in the context of social and economic inequality.

We begin with duration and then turn to lethality. Table 5 displays the effects of mass killing duration when interacting CSO measures with socioeconomic inequality, and table 6 reports these effects for social group inequality.

With regard to socioeconomic status, we find no evidence that it moderates or otherwise affects the relationship between civil society and the duration of mass killings. Specifically, we find no statistically significant interaction in any of these analyses using either the INSCR or TMK data. However, the main effects (noninteractions) relating to civil society are still statistically significant and in the same directions as before. This provides good evidence that the effect of civil society on the duration of violence is the same regardless of whether political power is apportioned according to wealth.

When it comes to social group inequality, however, we find significant evidence of an underlying, interactive relationship at work. With the INSCR data, we find significant interactions with civil society antisystem activity; with TMK, we see significant interactions with the core civil society index.

[81] Both scales are reversed from their original coding to facilitate interpretation. Higher scores signify greater inequality.

Table 5: Cox Proportional Hazards Model, Duration of Mass Killings, Interacting Civil Society with Socioeconomic Political Inequality

INSCR

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Internal War	0.284	1.075***	0.325
	(0.610)	(0.405)	(0.586)
Subgroup Discrim.	-1.044	-2.282**	-1.021
	(0.866)	(0.986)	(0.936)
IMR	-0.176	-1.301***	-0.340
	(0.542)	(0.499)	(0.485)
Population	0.174	-0.760**	0.016
	(0.282)	(0.322)	(0.274)
Ethnic Factionalization	-2.357	1.136	-2.004
	(1.642)	(1.407)	(1.541)
Polity 2	-0.146**	-0.011	-0.123**
	(0.069)	(0.052)	(0.059)
Military Regime	-0.609	-0.123	-0.912
	(0.654)	(0.692)	(0.740)
Party-Based Regime	-0.171	0.656	-0.153
	(0.376)	(0.520)	(0.458)
Personalist Regime	-0.414	-0.184	-0.391
	(0.570)	(0.547)	(0.633)
Recent Coup Attempt	0.141	0.418	0.302
	(0.670)	(0.447)	(0.661)
l.Core CS Index	4.655***		
	(1.273)		
Socioecon. Inequality	-0.101	0.181	-0.556*
	(0.272)	(0.295)	(0.326)
l.Core CS Index × Socioecon. Inequality	-1.492		
	(1.097)		
l.CS Anti-System Mvmnt		-1.016**	
		(0.409)	
l.CS Anti-System Mvmnt × Socioecon. Inequality		0.215	
		(0.203)	
l.CS Partic. Environment			0.638***
			(0.187)
l.CS Partic. Environment × Socioecon. Inequality			-0.088
			(0.209)
Observations	222	222	222

Standard errors in parentheses (clustered by mass killing event).
Region and decade fixed effects omitted from the table.
** p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01*

TMK

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Internal War	-0.723*	-0.791**	-0.703*
	(0.380)	(0.368)	(0.382)
Subgroup Discrim.	0.302	0.827	0.245
	(0.490)	(0.702)	(0.481)
IMR	0.669	0.516	0.533
	(0.568)	(0.617)	(0.567)
Population	0.313	-0.187	0.244
	(0.311)	(0.380)	(0.294)
Ethnic Factionalization	-0.972	-0.308	-0.722
	(1.316)	(1.501)	(1.259)
Polity 2	0.042	0.039	0.058
	(0.056)	(0.054)	(0.055)
Military Regime	0.096	0.241	0.119
	(0.541)	(0.601)	(0.560)
Party-Based Regime	0.942	-0.180	0.917
	(0.671)	(0.817)	(0.634)
Personalist Regime	-0.585	-0.801	-0.637
	(0.709)	(0.672)	(0.669)
Recent Coup Attempt	-0.067	-0.139	-0.076
	(0.387)	(0.418)	(0.391)
l.Core CS Index	0.027		
	(1.154)		
Socioecon. Inequality	0.331	0.244	0.220
	(0.302)	(0.216)	(0.209)
l.Core CS Index × Socioecon. Inequality	-0.335		
	(0.982)		
l.CS Anti-System Mvmnt		-0.455	
		(0.282)	
l.CS Anti-System Mvmnt × Socioecon. Inequality		0.305	
		(0.194)	
l.CS Partic. Environment			-0.149
			(0.190)
l.CS Partic. Environment × Socioecon. Inequality			-0.032
			(0.109)
Observations	195	195	195

Standard errors in parentheses (clustered by mass killing event).
Region and decade fixed effects omitted from the table.
** p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01*

Note: Coefficients refer to the odds of mass violence ending. Positive coefficients imply shorter mass killings, and negative coefficients imply longer mass killings. CS = civil society; IMR = infant mortality.

Table 6: Cox Proportional Hazards Model, Duration of Mass Killings, Interacting Civil Society with Social Group Political Inequality

INSCR

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Internal War	0.376	1.308**	0.411
	(0.392)	(0.556)	(0.366)
Subgroup Discrim.	-0.442	-1.826*	-0.346
	(0.826)	(0.949)	(0.813)
IMR	-1.108*	-1.347***	-1.149*
	(0.588)	(0.485)	(0.606)
Population	-0.243	-0.724**	-0.235
	(0.336)	(0.369)	(0.382)
Ethnic Factionalization	-2.673	0.117	-2.510
	(2.134)	(2.169)	(2.196)
Polity 2	-0.158*	-0.021	-0.181
	(0.091)	(0.057)	(0.124)
Military Regime	-1.372	-0.438	-1.928
	(1.211)	(0.975)	(1.337)
Party-Based Regime	0.924	0.750**	0.750
	(0.578)	(0.338)	(0.550)
Personalist Regime	-0.182	0.214	-0.660
	(0.696)	(0.657)	(0.646)
Recent Coup Attempt	0.834	0.609	0.933
	(0.686)	(0.606)	(0.668)
l.Core CS Index	3.977***		
	(1.311)		
Social Group Inequality	-0.525	-0.542*	-0.910**
	(0.378)	(0.277)	(0.395)
l.Core CS Index × Social Group Inequality	-1.316		
	(1.348)		
l.CS Anti-System Mvmnt		-0.566**	
		(0.266)	
l.CS Anti-System Mvmnt × Social Group Inequality		-0.262**	
		(0.127)	
l.CS Partic. Environment			0.837**
			(0.411)
l.CS Partic. Environment × Social Group Inequality			-0.250
			(0.237)
Observations	218	218	218

Standard errors in parentheses (clustered by mass killing event).
Region and decade fixed effects omitted from the table.
** p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01*

TMK

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Internal War	-0.866**	-0.592	-0.787*
	(0.410)	(0.398)	(0.403)
Subgroup Discrim.	0.767	0.878	0.451
	(0.551)	(0.717)	(0.490)
IMR	0.553	0.604	0.532
	(0.518)	(0.558)	(0.555)
Population	0.174	-0.037	0.150
	(0.233)	(0.333)	(0.250)
Ethnic Factionalization	-0.770	0.161	-0.515
	(1.212)	(2.256)	(1.373)
Polity 2	0.033	0.038	0.031
	(0.052)	(0.060)	(0.050)
Military Regime	0.259	0.580	0.124
	(0.550)	(0.842)	(0.636)
Party-Based Regime	0.419	0.518	0.372
	(0.480)	(0.517)	(0.469)
Personalist Regime	-0.462	-0.486	-0.543
	(0.719)	(0.899)	(0.691)
Recent Coup Attempt	-0.113	-0.103	-0.178
	(0.426)	(0.411)	(0.414)
l.Core CS Index	0.599		
	(1.269)		
Social Group Inequality	0.571*	0.156	-0.035
	(0.308)	(0.326)	(0.266)
l.Core CS Index × Social Group Inequality	-1.820***		
	(0.668)		
l.CS Anti-System Mvmnt		-0.143	
		(0.207)	
l.CS Anti-System Mvmnt × Social Group Inequality		-0.252	
		(0.190)	
l.CS Partic. Environment			0.052
			(0.252)
l.CS Partic. Environment × Social Group Inequality			-0.209
			(0.156)
Observations	195	195	195

Standard errors in parentheses (clustered by mass killing event).
Region and decade fixed effects omitted from the table.
** p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01*

Note: coefficients refer to the odds of mass violence ending. Positive coefficients imply shorter mass killings, and negative coefficients imply longer mass killings. CS = civil society; IMR = infant mortality.

To better understand the implications of these interactions, we plot their effects. In figures 3 and 4, we plot the hazard of mass killings ending across different levels of civil society antisystem activity (INSCR) and the core civil society index (TMK) with social group inequality. In figure 3, we see that mass killings are least likely to end when there is high antisystem activity and high social inequality. In figure 4, we see that the predicted likelihood of a mass killing ending is greatest when there is a free, robust civil society with low social group inequality (TMK). But this effect is entirely inverted when inequality is high: where inequality is at its peak and civil society remains robust, mass killings are the most likely to drag on. In effect, this means that inequality can essentially invert the influence of a robust civil society.

Figure 3: Predicted Hazard of Mass Killing Termination (INSCR), Civil Society Antisystem Behavior across Social Group Inequality



Figure 4: Predicted Hazard of Mass Killing Termination (TMK), Core Civil Society Organization Index across Social Group Inequality



Taken together, we find strong evidence that mass killings tend to occur for a shorter period in countries where political power is divided evenly between social groups and where robust, autonomous civil societies exist. Social group inequality similarly interacts with antisystem civil society to produce longer-enduring mass killings. And, while we continue to find evidence that civil society has an unmoderated shortening effect regardless of political context, the statistical results reveal that the broader political context is indeed meaningful to understanding how civil society operates. In particular, significant social group inequality can negate some of civil society's more positive influences on the duration of mass killing events.

We now turn to the lethality of mass violence and test the same interactions previously discussed. In table 7 we interact CSO measures with indexes of socioeconomic political inequality and in table 8, social group inequality. Overall, and in line with our results so far, we find that the overarching political context is important, with even stronger and more consistent evidence of a meaningful interaction at work.

Beginning with socioeconomic inequality, displayed in table 7, we find statistically significant interactions with a civil society's participatory environment across both data sets. In effect, we find strong evidence that mass killings generate more fatalities when there are high levels of socioeconomic discrimination along with robust civil society participation independent of the state. We plot the effect of this interaction in figure 5. Strikingly, the implication is nearly identical across data sets, underscoring the validity of these estimates.

In addition, and solely with the INSCR data, we find an interactive effect between socioeconomic political inequality and the core civil society index; and solely with TMK, we see the effect between inequality and civil society antisystem movements. As for the core index, the interpretation is virtually identical to that of the participatory environment, and the same is true for antisystem activity as well. We plot the interaction between antisystem activity and socioeconomic inequality in figure 6 (using TMK), and it shows that high antisystem activity and high inequality are correlated with some of the most lethal violence. Conversely, low levels of antisystem mobilization within highly equal societies are also associated with higher lethality.

Table 7: Linear Regression, Lethality of Mass Killings (INSCR), Interacting Civil Society with Socioeconomic Political Inequality

INSCR

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Duration	-0.019	-0.028	-0.019
	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.029)
Internal War	0.305	0.098	0.284
	(0.227)	(0.261)	(0.214)
Subgroup Discrim.	0.341	0.470*	0.507*
	(0.299)	(0.273)	(0.291)
IMR	0.405	0.558	0.456
	(0.418)	(0.413)	(0.423)
Population	-0.317	-0.052	-0.353
	(0.247)	(0.295)	(0.226)
Ethnic Factionalization	1.041	1.182	1.170
	(0.936)	(1.135)	(0.814)
Polity 2	-0.025	-0.012	-0.025
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.025)
Military Regime	0.987**	0.843	0.871**
	(0.408)	(0.504)	(0.368)
Party-Based Regime	0.506	0.560	0.338
	(0.387)	(0.384)	(0.432)
Personalist Regime	0.839**	0.399	0.729**
	(0.408)	(0.377)	(0.336)
Recent Coup Attempt	0.217	0.331	0.311
	(0.227)	(0.231)	(0.223)
l.Core CS Index	0.025		
	(0.670)		
Socioecon. Inequality	-0.479*	-0.093	0.283
	(0.279)	(0.186)	(0.190)
l.Core CS Index × Socioecon. Inequality	1.757**		
	(0.775)		
l.CS Anti-System Mvmnt		0.180	
		(0.175)	
l.CS Anti-System Mvmnt × Socioecon. Inequality		0.154	
		(0.095)	
l.CS Partic. Environment			0.050
			(0.103)
l.CS Partic. Environment × Socioecon. Inequality			0.332***
			(0.113)
Observations	258	258	258

Standard errors in parentheses (clustered by mass killing event).
Region and decade fixed effects omitted from the table.
** p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01*

TMK

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Duration	-0.073	-0.052	-0.081*
	(0.052)	(0.054)	(0.045)
Internal War	0.096	0.026	0.100
	(0.452)	(0.337)	(0.382)
Subgroup Discrim.	2.621***	2.196***	2.281***
	(0.743)	(0.723)	(0.845)
IMR	0.573	0.306	0.631
	(0.522)	(0.459)	(0.508)
Population	-0.040	-0.098	-0.124
	(0.465)	(0.433)	(0.440)
Ethnic Factionalization	-3.007	-2.891	-2.618
	(2.041)	(2.037)	(1.918)
Polity 2	-0.082**	-0.042	-0.076*
	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.042)
Military Regime	2.176***	2.377***	2.168***
	(0.604)	(0.740)	(0.734)
Party-Based Regime	0.549	-0.198	0.508
	(1.384)	(0.757)	(1.271)
Personalist Regime	0.809	0.452	0.572
	(0.573)	(0.670)	(0.498)
Recent Coup Attempt	-0.753**	-0.694*	-0.643*
	(0.371)	(0.364)	(0.387)
l.Core CS Index	1.088		
	(1.322)		
Socioecon. Inequality	-0.426	-0.245	-0.020
	(0.423)	(0.288)	(0.422)
l.Core CS Index × Socioecon. Inequality	0.403		
	(0.974)		
l.CS Anti-System Mvmnt		0.040	
		(0.154)	
l.CS Anti-System Mvmnt × Socioecon. Inequality		0.333*	
		(0.176)	
l.CS Partic. Environment			0.213
			(0.208)
l.CS Partic. Environment × Socioecon. Inequality			0.250*
			(0.147)
Observations	200	200	200

Standard errors in parentheses (clustered by mass killing event).
Region and decade fixed effects omitted from the table.
** p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01*

Note: CS = civil society; IMR = infant mortality.

Figure 5: Predicted Severity of Mass Violence, Civil Society Participatory Environment across Socioeconomic Political Inequality



Note: CS = civil society.

Taken together, the escalatory effect of civil society is again apparent, but we also find that robust civil society participatory environments are correlated with more severe mass killings when socioeconomic inequality is higher. When political inequality is low and the distribution of political power is more equal, with a robust civil society, mass killings tend to be less severe. Thus, it does not seem to be the case that robust civil societies inexorably lead to more lethal mass killings, except when political power is concentrated in the hands of wealthy elites.

Figure 6: Predicted Severity of Mass Violence, Civil Society Antisystem Activity and Socioeconomic Political Inequality (TMK)



Note: CS = civil society.

When we examine the effects of social group political inequality on lethality, the results are quite different. First, using the TMK data we do not find any statistically significant interactions between civil society measures and this particular variant of political inequality. Rather, we find meaningful interactions only when using the INSCR data and between inequality and civil society antisystem activity. We plot the effect in figure 7, which suggests that both higher levels of antisystem activity and civil society participation are linked to more fatalities when groups share political power. Why might this be the case? It is plausible that such situations—where mass violence has begun and no single group wields a commanding amount of political power—lead to even greater levels of animosity between communities, which see their own survival linked to establishing total domination over others. This comports with research on civil wars that, relatedly, comes to similar conclusions about the dynamics of power sharing between ethnic and religious groups and about how parity can sometimes be more problematic than outright domination.[82] It is also possible that these conditions contributed to the onset of violence in the first place, although we do not test that explicitly.

Table 8: Linear Regression, Severity of Mass Killings, Interacting Civil Society with Social Group Political Inequality

INSCR

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Duration	-0.014	-0.032	-0.016
	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.028)
Internal War	0.269	0.258	0.238
	(0.230)	(0.227)	(0.221)
Subgroup Discrim.	0.330	0.456	0.327
	(0.309)	(0.308)	(0.314)
IMR	0.516	0.465	0.623
	(0.414)	(0.377)	(0.463)
Population	-0.082	0.080	-0.067
	(0.272)	(0.236)	(0.294)
Ethnic Factionalization	0.708	1.260	0.905
	(0.919)	(0.897)	(0.898)
Polity 2	-0.030	-0.018	-0.040
	(0.028)	(0.023)	(0.028)
Military Regime	0.831**	1.266**	0.720*
	(0.386)	(0.574)	(0.372)
Party-Based Regime	0.695	0.639*	0.478
	(0.476)	(0.371)	(0.542)
Personalist Regime	0.581	0.483	0.476
	(0.360)	(0.354)	(0.325)
Recent Coup Attempt	0.270	0.286	0.263
	(0.221)	(0.239)	(0.209)
l.Core CS Index	0.751		
	(0.945)		
Social Group Inequality	0.075	0.391	-0.063
	(0.254)	(0.238)	(0.221)
l.Core CS Index × Social Group Inequality	-0.318		
	(0.682)		
l.CS Anti-System Mvmnt		0.441***	
		(0.149)	
l.CS Anti-System Mvmnt × Social Group Inequality		-0.314**	
		(0.120)	
l.CS Partic. Environment			0.271
			(0.210)
l.CS Partic. Environment × Social Group Inequality			-0.169
			(0.126)
Observations	258	258	258

Standard errors in parentheses (clustered by mass killing event).
Region and decade fixed effects omitted from the table.
** p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01*

TMK

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Duration	-0.044	-0.059*	-0.048
	(0.044)	(0.035)	(0.038)
Internal War	0.325	0.377	0.330
	(0.420)	(0.380)	(0.428)
Subgroup Discrim.	2.261***	1.909***	2.278***
	(0.588)	(0.645)	(0.553)
IMR	0.393	0.192	0.340
	(0.591)	(0.553)	(0.576)
Population	0.072	0.133	0.097
	(0.429)	(0.406)	(0.411)
Ethnic Factionalization	-3.484*	-3.202	-3.696**
	(1.942)	(1.972)	(1.828)
Polity 2	-0.076	-0.052	-0.068
	(0.054)	(0.046)	(0.049)
Military Regime	2.106***	2.872***	2.042***
	(0.688)	(0.940)	(0.670)
Party-Based Regime	1.194	0.901	1.210
	(1.634)	(1.253)	(1.604)
Personalist Regime	0.529	0.644	0.564
	(0.632)	(0.641)	(0.607)
Recent Coup Attempt	-0.668*	-0.616*	-0.602
	(0.389)	(0.349)	(0.372)
l.Core CS Index	0.753		
	(1.656)		
Social Group Inequality	-0.194	0.119	0.020
	(0.375)	(0.292)	(0.262)
l.Core CS Index × Social Group Inequality	0.623		
	(0.875)		
l.CS Anti-System Mvmnt		0.303	
		(0.328)	
l.CS Anti-System Mvmnt × Social Group Inequality		-0.287	
		(0.309)	
l.CS Partic. Environment			0.055
			(0.251)
l.CS Partic. Environment × Social Group Inequality			0.107
			(0.104)
Observations	200	200	200

Standard errors in parentheses (clustered by mass killing event).
Region and decade fixed effects omitted from the table.
** p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01*

Note: CS = civil society; IMR = infant mortality.

[82] David D. Laitin, *Hegemony and Culture: Politics and Change among the Yoruba* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986).

Figure 7: Predicted Severity of Violence (INSCR), Civil Society Antisystem Activity across Social Group Political Inequality



Note: CSO = civil society organization.

To understand how these results apply in a case, consider the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, which was one of the shortest but most severe episodes of mass violence in recent history. Rwanda had relatively robust civil society participation in 1994, earning a score of 0.403 compared with a mean of 0.279 for all countries experiencing a mass killing event. For social group inequality, the country received a score of −0.006 (neither full equality nor inequality), but for all countries experiencing mass killings in the INSCR data, the average score was 0.845. Rwanda was therefore well below this figure during its genocide. When it comes to socioeconomic inequality, Rwanda scored 0.625 in 1994, and the average score for all countries experiencing mass violence was 0.278—thus Rwanda was well above this figure.[83] Taken together, we see that Rwanda had nearly inverse proportions of social group and sociopolitical inequality, along with a relatively robust civil society. This comports with our finding that these two types of inequality have contradictory effects on duration and lethality.

[83] This figure (for social group inequality) is largely consistent even for the ten years prior to the genocide. The opposite is true of socioeconomic inequality, which jumped from −0.466 in 1993 to 0.625 in 1994. In future research it would be worth exploring how trends in these values, and not static measurements, affect the severity and duration of violence.

Table 9: Summary of Findings

Metric	Duration	Lethality	Hypothesis
Core Civil Society Index	Shorter		H1 partial
Participatory Environment	Shorter	High lethality when antisystem activity is also high	H2 partial and qualified
Antisystem Activity	Longer	High lethality when CSOs are free or totally state sponsored	H2a qualified
State-Aligned Civil Society	Longer	High lethality when civil society is acquiescent	H2b qualified
Socioeconomic Inequality*Core Civil Society Index		Higher lethality	H3b qualified
Socioeconomic Inequality*Participatory Environment		High lethality when CSOs are free or totally state sponsored	H3b qualified
Socioeconomic Inequality*Antisystem Activity			
Social Group Inequality*Core Civil Society Index	Shorter		H3a qualified
Social Group Inequality*Participatory Environment			
Social Group Inequality*Antisystem Activity	Longer	Higher lethality	H3a and H3b qualified

Note: Only significant estimates shown; an asterisk indicates that the variable was statistically significant in only one model.

Taken Together: The Effects of Civil Society on Mass Killings in Context

Table 9 summarizes our results and how they relate to our hypotheses, and table 10 summarizes the implications for mass violence. In general, our findings provide qualified evidence for both the optimists and the pessimists. Both mechanisms on the pessimistic side—the vulnerability and mobilization mechanisms—appear to have some validity. We also find that the effects of civil society on the duration and lethality of mass killings are conditional on civil society polarization or political inequality.

On the whole, we find that socioeconomic inequality is more strongly linked to patterns of mass killing lethality, and social group inequality to patterns of mass killing duration. Lethality is highest with robust civil societies and high socioeconomic inequality, and duration is longest with robust antisystem civil societies and high social group inequality.

Conclusion

In this exploratory research, we find that various dimensions of civil society are linked, in meaningful ways, to the duration and lethality of mass killings, particularly when such civil societies represent a deeply polarized or deeply unequal society. We summarize these effects in table 10. Drawing on the work of civil society pessimists and optimists, we took seriously the possibility that civil society groups can be just as active in propelling and intensifying mass killings as they can be in de-escalating or terminating them.

Table 10: Implications for Mass Violence

	Restraining	Escalating
Duration	Robust, Autonomous Civil Society, especially with High Social Group Equality	Strongly State-Opposed or Strongly State-Aligned Civil Society, especially with Low Social Group Equality
Severity	Autonomous Civil Society, especially with High Socioeconomic Equality	Robust Civil Society with Low Socioeconomic Equality; Strongly State-Opposed or Strongly State-Aligned Civil Society; Antisystem Civil Society Activity, with High Social Group Equality

Analyzing two different data sets of mass violence, we find evidence that robust civil societies are generally linked to shorter spells of violence. However, this finding is complicated by the behavior of civil society and the context in which it operates. When civil society is strongly aligned with or against the state, then violence can drag on. This effect is even stronger in countries where power is distributed according to one's social group. Interestingly, we do not find that any level of socioeconomic inequality causes civil society to operate differently. Thus, while generally linked to shorter spells of violence, civil society can have the inverse effect depending on the level of social group inequality.

When it comes to the lethality of mass violence, we again encounter results that suggest a complex underlying relationship. Here, civil society's effect diverges across socioeconomic and social group inequality. Robust civil societies are strongly linked to more lethal violence when socioeconomic inequality is high. This finding holds across the two data sets we study and is statistically robust. Yet, we find evidence of the inverse relationship at work when it comes to social group inequality: when civil society is robust, violence is most lethal when all social groups share power equally. Although this is most evident within one of the two data sets (INSCR), the estimated relationship is quite strong. Finally, we find that violence tends to be more severe in countries where civil society exists at the extreme ends of its relationship with the state—that is, when it is staunchly independent or largely controlled by the state. In these two opposite cases, mass violence is expected to be at its most severe.

Taken together, our evidence reveals that civil society is linked to the dynamics of mass violence in important albeit complex ways. The behavior of civil society groups and the groups' relationship to the state are highly significant to how mass violence unfolds. In addition, civil society does not exert consistent effects across societal and political contexts. Its effect is partly conditioned by the equal or unequal division of political power within states, and the type of inequality also matters. We find different

effects when we evaluate two different types of societal inequality. Holding constant a robust civil society, socioeconomic *inequality* but social group *equality* are linked with some of the worst and most prolonged periods of violence. This implies that there are reasons to be skeptical of civil society optimists, but the most pessimistic expectations seem at least partly conditional on other structural power relationships within the society.

It is important to remember that our research focuses on cases where mass violence has already begun. It is unclear how, if it all, these conditions affect the onset of violence in the first place. Perhaps a robust and autonomous civil society makes mass killings less likely, but once they begin in unequal societies, such civil society accelerates conflict dynamics. More work is needed to assess this first stage and determine how it relates to the dynamics of violence afterward.

In light of our findings, it is worth recalling Simone Chambers and Jeffrey Kopstein's observation that among policy circles, in particular, "there remains a lingering neo-Tocquevillian enthusiasm for participation as such, especially when it is conceived, as [Robert] Putnam conceives it, as a choice between civic engagement and individual apathy."[84] Indeed, for several decades, the United States has adopted a policy of actively promoting civil society as a way to increase capacity for liberal democracy as well as the spread of trust and norms of mutual respect and reciprocity as a way to prevent conflict. Although on balance such initiatives may have yielded important benefits—particularly regarding preventing the onset of mass killings—such benefits may evaporate or reverse course once mass killings begin. During episodes of mass killings, the creation or support of civil society in pursuit of reinforcing norms of cooperation may create acceleratory and escalatory effects when such groups are targeted[85] or mobilized during mass killings.[86] The creation or support of civil society in and of itself does not necessarily result in egalitarian or pluralistic norms. As we continue to explore which mechanisms are dominant in different cases, our findings point to the importance of addressing underlying conditions of polarization and class or social group inequality to reduce risks of mass killing escalation. Furthermore, the findings suggest the need to avoid lionizing the motivations of "ordinary people," particularly during national crises or episodes of mass violence, during which the exercise of collective agency often results in exceedingly lethal outcomes.[87]

However, given our exploratory findings, we are left with more questions than answers about what viable alternatives are available from a practical perspective. What is needed is a way to expand and reinforce the public benefits of social capital and civil society while reducing the risk that such institutions become

[84] Chambers and Kopstein, "Bad Civil Society," 842.

[85] Kopstein and Wittenberg, *Intimate Violence*.

[86] Longman, *Christianity and Genocide in Rwanda*; McDoom, "Antisocial Capital."

[87] Christopher R. Browning, *Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland* (New York: HarperCollins, 1992); Chambers and Kopstein, "Bad Civil Society"; Longman, *Christianity and Genocide in Rwanda*; McDoom, "Antisocial Capital"; James Waller, *Becoming Evil: How Ordinary People Commit Genocide and Mass Killing* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).

fundamentally illiberal in nature, particularly given the increase in global inequality worldwide. Scholars who recognize these tensions are often at a loss for how to establish clear pathways forward.[88]

But some research from the peacebuilding literature, which focuses largely on institutional design approaches, shows promising pathways toward designing and implementing ways to bridge social capital even in deeply divided societies. Staub identifies a number of successful peacebuilding projects that involved long-term intergroup cooperation and that seemed to reduce tendencies toward violence during crises.[89] For instance, many rescuers of Jews during the Holocaust had diverse and cross-cutting social relationships, including with Jews.[90] In a study conducted in Sri Lanka, Sinhalese and Tamils engaged in coethnic educational activities for four days; one year later, they displayed more empathy for members of the other group and donated more to poor children in the other group, compared with members of the control group.[91] Ethnic groups in the Ivory Coast successfully remained nonviolent when violence flared up there in 2011 after working together on agricultural projects.[92] Hindus and Muslims in India who had worked together in both commercial ventures and civic institutions brought pressure on political leaders to avoid inciting violence during periods of political tensions.[93] Positive attitudes between Israeli and Palestinian students emerged after they spent time together at summer camps; however, these affinities wore off after a year, reinforcing the need for repeated, enduring interactions alongside supportive environments.[94]

Yet there are reasons to be skeptical of the durability (or scalability) of these restraining factors once mass killing has already begun. McDoom finds that, at least in the Rwandan case, such ties easily fade away in comparison to strong networks of fellow perpetrators, whose influence overwhelms intergroup goodwill or altruism.[95]

Another possible solution is implied using Braun's findings.[96] Investing in civil society empowers minority groups rather than groups that are already positioned close to power. Such groups could provide powerful sources of resistance and rescue during periods of mass violence. Yet Kopstein and Wittenberg also note that investing in and empowering minority civil society organizations may make them more vulnerable to pogroms and mass killing in times of crisis.[97] In other words, the dilemmas regarding promoting civil society—and determining which kinds of civil society to promote—are real and

[88] For example, Chambers and Kopstein, "Bad Civil Society."
[89] Staub, "Building a Peaceful Society."
[90] Oliner and Oliner, *The Altruistic Personality*.
[91] Deepak Malhotra and Sumanasiri Liyanage, "Long-Term Effects of Peace Workshops in Protracted Conflicts," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49, no. 6 (2005): 908–24.
[92] Chirot and McCauley, *Why Not Kill Them All?,* cited in Staub,"Building a Peaceful Society," 580.
[93] Varshney, *Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life*.
[94] Phillip L. Hammack, *Narrative and the Politics of Identity: The Cultural Psychology of Israeli and Palestinian Youth* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).
[95] McDoom, "Antisocial Capital."
[96] Braun, "Religious Minorities and Resistance to Genocide."
[97] Kopstein and Wittenberg, *Intimate Violence*.

substantial if policy makers are attempting to use them as beachheads against escalation in societies at risk of mass killings.[98]

Ultimately, the only way to resolve these dilemmas may be one that is unrelated to civil society and more related to resolving the underlying inequalities that lead people to segregate into exclusionary civil society organizations in the first place. Unfortunately, we offer this grandiose policy implication without a concrete recommendation for how to realize it. Regardless, we can say with assurance that our findings speak to the heightened urgency of prevention as a policy goal, rather than of civil society capacity building alone.

[98] A parallel policy dilemma is present with regard to international criminal accountability mechanisms, which appear to have the effect of both deterring atrocities and prolonging conflicts once they have begun (see Daniel Krcmaric, "Should I Stay or Should I Go? Leaders, Exile, and the Dilemmas of International Justice, *American Journal of Political Science* 62, no. 2 [2018]: 486–98). We thank Lawrence Woocher for this observation.

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Appendix

Table A1: Replicating Primary Models while Interacting the Participatory Environment with Antisystem Activity

	(1) Severity (INSCR)	(2) Severity (TMK)	(3) Duration (INSCR)	(4) Duration (TMK)
Duration	-0.025	-0.022		
	(0.029)	(0.028)		
Internal War	0.476	0.142	1.383***	-0.673
	(0.297)	(0.232)	(0.419)	(0.414)
Subgroup Discrim.	1.875***	0.448	-2.623***	0.877
	(0.525)	(0.289)	(0.949)	(0.688)
IMR	0.472	0.590	-0.967**	0.645
	(0.526)	(0.390)	(0.444)	(0.572)
Population	-0.104	0.048	-0.535**	0.090
	(0.281)	(0.246)	(0.252)	(0.309)
Ethnic Factionalization	-2.491**	0.721	-0.650	-0.685
	(1.254)	(0.853)	(1.620)	(1.559)
Polity 2	-0.074	-0.037	-0.137**	0.042
	(0.049)	(0.026)	(0.060)	(0.050)
Military Regime	2.611***	0.904*	-0.589	-0.003
	(0.975)	(0.501)	(0.693)	(0.792)
Party-Based Regime	0.470	0.611	0.132	0.238
	(0.795)	(0.377)	(0.369)	(0.421)
Personalist Regime	0.319	0.443	-0.265	-0.420
	(0.433)	(0.358)	(0.559)	(0.711)
Recent Coup Attempt	-0.741**	0.314	0.486	-0.121
	(0.359)	(0.224)	(0.484)	(0.417)
l.CS Anti-System Mvmnt	0.223	0.366**	-0.661**	-0.218
	(0.221)	(0.147)	(0.257)	(0.223)
l.CS Partic. Environment	0.100	-0.093	0.382**	-0.022
	(0.169)	(0.167)	(0.193)	(0.257)
l.CS Anti-System Mvmnt × l.CS Partic. Environment	0.396***	0.181*	0.348***	0.012
	(0.140)	(0.091)	(0.114)	(0.135)
Observations	200	258	222	195

Standard errors in parentheses (clustered by mass killing event).
Region and decade fixed effects omitted from the table.
** p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01*

Note: CS = civil society; IMR = infant mortality.

Figure A1: Plotting the Interaction between Antisystem Activity and the Participatory Environment from Table A1, Model 3



Note: AS = antisystem.

Table A2: Country-Years with Mass Killings across INSCR and TMK Data

INSCR		*TMK*	
Country	Year	Country	Year
Afghanistan	1978	Afghanistan	1978
Afghanistan	1979	Afghanistan	1997
Afghanistan	1980	Afghanistan	1998
Afghanistan	1981	Afghanistan	1999
Afghanistan	1982	Afghanistan	2000
Afghanistan	1983	Afghanistan	2001
Afghanistan	1984	Afghanistan	1979
Afghanistan	1985	Afghanistan	1980
Afghanistan	1986	Afghanistan	1981
Afghanistan	1987	Afghanistan	1982
Afghanistan	1988	Afghanistan	1983
Afghanistan	1989	Afghanistan	1984
Afghanistan	1990	Afghanistan	1985
Afghanistan	1991	Afghanistan	1986
Afghanistan	1992	Afghanistan	1987
Angola	1976	Afghanistan	1988
Angola	1977	Angola	1992

Country	Year	Country	Year
Angola	1978	Argentina	1976
Angola	1979	Argentina	1977
Angola	1980	Argentina	1978
Angola	1981	Argentina	1979
Angola	1982	Argentina	1980
Angola	1983	Argentina	1981
Angola	1984	Argentina	1982
Angola	1985	Argentina	1983
Angola	1986	Bangladesh	1980
Angola	1987	Bangladesh	1984
Angola	1988	Bangladesh	1986
Angola	1989	Bangladesh	1992
Angola	1990	Bosnia-Herzegovina	1992
Angola	1991	Burundi	1965
Angola	1992	Burundi	1972
Angola	1993	Burundi	1988
Angola	1994	Burundi	1995
Angola	1998	Burundi	1996
Angola	1999	Burundi	1997
Angola	2000	Burundi	1998
Angola	2001	Burundi	1999
Angola	2002	Burundi	2000
Argentina	1976	Burundi	2001
Argentina	1977	Burundi	2002
Argentina	1978	Burundi	2003
Argentina	1979	Burundi	2004
Argentina	1980	Burundi	2005
Bosnia and Herzegovina	1992	Cambodia	1970
Bosnia and Herzegovina	1993	Cambodia	1975
Bosnia and Herzegovina	1994	Cambodia	1976
Bosnia and Herzegovina	1995	Cambodia	1977
Burma	1978	Cambodia	1978
Burundi	1965	Central African Republic	2013
Burundi	1966	Chad	1982
Burundi	1967	Chad	1983

Country	Year	Country	Year
Burundi	1968	Chad	1984
Burundi	1969	Chad	1985
Burundi	1970	Chad	1986
Burundi	1971	Chad	1987
Burundi	1972	Chad	1988
Burundi	1973	Chad	1989
Burundi	1988	Chad	1990
Burundi	1993	Chile	1973
Cambodia	1975	Chile	1974
Cambodia	1976	Chile	1975
Cambodia	1977	Chile	1976
Cambodia	1978	China	1958
Cambodia	1979	China	1959
Central African Republic	2013	China	1959
Chile	1973	China	1961
Chile	1974	China	1962
Chile	1975	China	1966
Chile	1976	China	1967
China	1959	China	1968
China	1966	China	1969
China	1967	China	1970
China	1968	China	1971
China	1969	China	1972
China	1970	China	1973
China	1971	China	1974
China	1972	China	1975
China	1973	China	1976
China	1974	Congo	1997
China	1975	Croatia	1995
Congo-Kinshasa	1964	Democratic Republic of Congo (Zaire)	1996
Congo-Kinshasa	1965	Democratic Republic of Congo (Zaire), Uganda	1997
Congo-Kinshasa	1977	Democratic Republic of Congo (Zaire)	2016
Congo-Kinshasa	1978	Democratic Republic of Congo (Zaire)	2017
Congo-Kinshasa	1979	Democratic Republic of Congo (Zaire)	2009
El Salvador	1980	Democratic Republic of Congo (Zaire)	1960

Country	Year	Country	Year
El Salvador	1981	Democratic Republic of Congo (Zaire)	1964
El Salvador	1982	Democratic Republic of Congo (Zaire)	1965
El Salvador	1983	Democratic Republic of Congo (Zaire)	1966
El Salvador	1984	Democratic Republic of Congo (Zaire)	1967
El Salvador	1985	Democratic Republic of Congo (Zaire)	1968
El Salvador	1986	Egypt	2013
El Salvador	1987	El Salvador	1980
El Salvador	1988	El Salvador	1981
El Salvador	1989	El Salvador	1982
Equatorial Guinea	1969	El Salvador	1983
Equatorial Guinea	1970	El Salvador	1984
Equatorial Guinea	1971	El Salvador	1985
Equatorial Guinea	1972	El Salvador	1989
Equatorial Guinea	1973	Equatorial Guinea	1969
Equatorial Guinea	1974	Equatorial Guinea	1970
Equatorial Guinea	1975	Equatorial Guinea	1971
Equatorial Guinea	1976	Equatorial Guinea	1972
Equatorial Guinea	1977	Equatorial Guinea	1973
Equatorial Guinea	1978	Equatorial Guinea	1974
Equatorial Guinea	1979	Equatorial Guinea	1975
Ethiopia	1976	Equatorial Guinea	1976
Ethiopia	1977	Equatorial Guinea	1977
Ethiopia	1978	Equatorial Guinea	1978
Ethiopia	1979	Equatorial Guinea	1979
Guatemala	1978	Ethiopia	1967
Guatemala	1979	Ethiopia	1970
Guatemala	1980	Ethiopia	1971
Guatemala	1981	Ethiopia	1976
Guatemala	1982	Ethiopia	1977
Guatemala	1983	Ethiopia	1978
Guatemala	1984	Ethiopia	1988
Guatemala	1985	Ethiopia	1989
Guatemala	1986	Ethiopia	2012
Guatemala	1987	Ethiopia	2015
Guatemala	1988	Ethiopia	2016

Country	Year	Country	Year
Guatemala	1989	Ethiopia	2017
Guatemala	1990	Guatemala	1978
Indonesia	1965	Guatemala	1981
Indonesia	1966	Guatemala	1982
Indonesia	1975	Guatemala	1983
Indonesia	1976	Haiti	1957
Indonesia	1977	Haiti	1958
Indonesia	1978	Haiti	1959
Indonesia	1979	Haiti	1960
Indonesia	1980	Haiti	1961
Indonesia	1981	Haiti	1962
Indonesia	1982	Haiti	1963
Indonesia	1983	Haiti	1964
Indonesia	1984	Haiti	1965
Indonesia	1985	Haiti	1966
Indonesia	1986	Haiti	1967
Indonesia	1987	Haiti	1968
Indonesia	1988	Haiti	1969
Indonesia	1989	Haiti	1970
Indonesia	1990	Haiti	1971
Indonesia	1991	India	1984
Indonesia	1992	Indonesia	1965
Iran	1981	Indonesia	1965
Iran	1982	Indonesia	1966
Iran	1983	Indonesia	1966
Iran	1984	Indonesia	1967
Iran	1985	Indonesia	1967
Iran	1986	Indonesia	1968
Iran	1987	Indonesia	1969
Iran	1988	Indonesia	1975
Iran	1989	Indonesia	1976
Iran	1990	Indonesia	1977
Iran	1991	Indonesia	1978
Iran	1992	Indonesia	1979
Iraq	1963	Indonesia	1980
Iraq	1964	Indonesia	1981

Country	Year	Country	Year
Iraq	1965	Indonesia	1985
Iraq	1966	Indonesia	1991
Iraq	1967	Indonesia	1999
Iraq	1968	Iran	1979
Iraq	1969	Iran	1980
Iraq	1970	Iran	1981
Iraq	1971	Iran	1982
Iraq	1972	Iran	1983
Iraq	1973	Iran	1984
Iraq	1974	Iran	1985
Iraq	1975	Iran	1988
Iraq	1988	Iraq	1983
Iraq	1989	Iraq	1987
Iraq	1990	Iraq	1988
Iraq	1991	Iraq, Kuwait	1991
Nigeria	1967	Ivory Coast	2004
Nigeria	1968	Ivory Coast	2010
Nigeria	1969	Ivory Coast	2011
Nigeria	1970	Kenya	1980
Pakistan (1972–)	1973	Kenya	1981
Pakistan (1972–)	1974	Kenya	1984
Pakistan (1972–)	1975	Kenya	2007
Pakistan (1972–)	1976	Kenya	2008
Pakistan (1972–)	1977	Laos	1975
Philippines	1972	Laos	1976
Philippines	1973	Laos	1977
Philippines	1974	Laos	1978
Philippines	1975	Laos	1979
Philippines	1976	Laos	1980
Rwanda	1963	Libya	2011
Rwanda	1964	Mali	1991
Rwanda	1994	Myanmar (Burma)	2017
Somalia	1988	Myanmar (Burma)	1962
Somalia	1989	Myanmar (Burma)	1963
Somalia	1990	Myanmar (Burma)	1964

Country	Year	Country	Year
Somalia	1991	Myanmar (Burma)	1965
Sri Lanka	1989	Myanmar (Burma)	1966
Sri Lanka	1990	Myanmar (Burma)	1967
Sri Lanka	2008	Myanmar (Burma)	1968
Sri Lanka	2009	Myanmar (Burma)	1969
Sudan	1956	Myanmar (Burma)	1970
Sudan	1957	Myanmar (Burma)	1971
Sudan	1958	Myanmar (Burma)	1972
Sudan	1959	Myanmar (Burma)	1973
Sudan	1960	Myanmar (Burma)	1974
Sudan	1961	Myanmar (Burma)	1975
Sudan	1962	Myanmar (Burma)	1976
Sudan	1963	Myanmar (Burma)	1977
Sudan	1964	Myanmar (Burma)	1978
Sudan	1965	Myanmar (Burma)	1979
Sudan	1966	Myanmar (Burma)	1980
Sudan	1967	Myanmar (Burma)	1981
Sudan	1968	Myanmar (Burma)	1982
Sudan	1969	Myanmar (Burma)	1983
Sudan	1970	Myanmar (Burma)	1984
Sudan	1971	Myanmar (Burma)	1985
Sudan	1972	Myanmar (Burma)	1986
Sudan	1983	Myanmar (Burma)	1987
Sudan	1984	Myanmar (Burma)	1988
Sudan	1985	Myanmar (Burma)	1989
Sudan	1986	Myanmar (Burma)	1990
Sudan	1987	Myanmar (Burma)	1991
Sudan	1988	Myanmar (Burma), Bangladesh	1992
Sudan	1989	Myanmar (Burma)	2012
Sudan	1990	Nigeria	1967
Sudan	1991	Nigeria	1968
Sudan	1992	Nigeria	1969
Sudan	1993	Nigeria	1970
Sudan	1994	Nigeria	2001
Sudan	1995	North Korea/South Korea	1950
Sudan	1996	North Korea/South Korea	1951

Country	Year	Country	Year
Sudan	1997	North Korea/South Korea	1952
Sudan	1998	North Korea/South Korea	1953
Sudan	1999	North Korea	1956
Sudan	2000	North Korea	1957
Sudan	2001	North Korea	1958
Sudan	2002	North Korea	1959
Sudan	2003	North Vietnam	1954
Sudan	2004	North Vietnam	1955
Sudan	2005	North Vietnam	1956
Sudan	2006	North Vietnam	1957
Sudan	2007	Pakistan	1971
Sudan	2008	Philippines	1974
Sudan	2009	Rumania	1989
Sudan	2010	Russia (Soviet Union)	1995
Syria	1981	Russia (Soviet Union)	1999
Syria	1982	Russia (Soviet Union)	2000
Uganda	1971	Russia (Soviet Union)	2001
Uganda	1972	Rwanda	1963
Uganda	1973	Rwanda	1964
Uganda	1974	Rwanda	1991
Uganda	1975	Rwanda	1992
Uganda	1976	Rwanda	1993
Uganda	1977	Rwanda	1994
Uganda	1978	Rwanda	1997
Uganda	1979	Serbia (Yugoslavia)	1998
Uganda	1980	Serbia (Yugoslavia)	1999
Uganda	1981	Somalia	1988
Uganda	1982	Somalia	1989
Uganda	1983	Somalia	1991
Uganda	1984	South Korea	1948
Uganda	1985	South Korea	1950
Uganda	1986	South Korea	1951
Vietnam, South	1965	South Sudan	2013
Vietnam, South	1966	South Sudan	2014
Vietnam, South	1967	South Sudan	2015

Country	Year	Country	Year
Vietnam, South	1968	South Sudan	2016
Vietnam, South	1969	South Sudan	2017
Vietnam, South	1970	South Vietnam	1955
Vietnam, South	1971	South Vietnam	1956
Vietnam, South	1972	South Vietnam	1957
Vietnam, South	1973	Soviet Union	1956
Vietnam, South	1974	Sri Lanka	1990
		Sri Lanka	1991
		Sri Lanka	2009
		Sudan	1965
		Sudan	1985
		Sudan	1986
		Sudan	1987
		Sudan	1988
		Sudan	1989
		Sudan	1990
		Sudan	1991
		Sudan	1992
		Sudan	1993
		Sudan	1994
		Sudan	1995
		Sudan	1996
		Sudan	1997
		Sudan	1998
		Sudan	1999
		Sudan	2000
		Sudan	2002
		Sudan	2003
		Sudan	2004
		Chad, Sudan	2005
		Sudan, Chad	2006
		Sudan	2007
		Sudan	2008
		Sudan	2011
		Sudan	2011
		Sudan, South Sudan	2012

Country	Year	Country	Year
		Sudan	2014
		Sudan	2015
		Sudan	2016
		Syria	1980
		Syria	1982
		Syria	2011
		Syria	2012
		Syria	2013
		Taiwan	1947
		Uganda	1966
		Uganda	1967
		Uganda	1968
		Uganda	1969
		Uganda	1970
		Uganda	1971
		Uganda	1972
		Uganda	1973
		Uganda	1974
		Uganda	1975
		Uganda	1976
		Uganda	1977
		Uganda	1978
		Uganda	1979
		Uganda	1981
		Uganda	1982
		Uganda	1983
		Uganda	1984
		Uganda	1985
		Uzbekistan	2005
		Zimbabwe	1983
		Zimbabwe	1984
		Zimbabwe	1985
		Zimbabwe	1986
		Zimbabwe	1987

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